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Abstract 
The relationship between the deliberate reinvention of the wheel, for macroeconomic indices such as interest rate, 
inflation, exchange rate, stock prices, index of industrial output within the electoral windows and the political parties’ 
(incumbent and opposition) ideology is the focus of this study. Monthly macroeconomic data for UK, USA, Japan, 
China, Hong Kong, Egypt, South Africa, Brazil, Nigeria, France and Germany from Morgan Stanley Capital 
International (MSCI) as well as World Bank for the period of 2000-2015 were used in the study. Employing majorly, 
the dynamic Genaralized Method of Moment (GMM) estimation technique, the study reveals that the coefficients of 
partisanship effects have the same negative signs and is significant for all the countries except Nigeria and Egypt. 
Also, the coefficients are similar in terms of size (US and China). Hence, the results show that party orientation does 
have significant impact on stock market returns of the selected countries with greater impact on Nigeria and Egypt. 
Strengthening the various regulatory agencies in charge of these macroeconomic policies is recommended to avoid 
this uncessary manoeuvring in governance. We are of the view that automation of capital markets activities will 
reduce the chances of manipulating capital market economic data.   
Keywords: election, macro economic indices, monetary policy, capital market efficiency, partisanship, governance 
style 
JEL Classification: D72, E52, G14, P16, H11 
1. Introduction  
Partisan theory of business cycle is the alteration in the fiscal and monetary policies that exist between political 
parties and general economic indices within their duration in office (Franzese, 2002). Where the opposition 
government aims to boost the aggregate real economic activity using full employment as a critical factor, the 
incumbent usually focuses on aggressive reduction of inflation rate (Koksal amd Aliskan (2012). Each of these goals 
has multiplier effect on the wellness of the citizenry. Governments’ alteration of its discretionary power to levy taxes 
and charges during electoral window, deliberate alteration of market-enhancing regulations and future policies 
affecting the business cycle lend credence to the interplay of sub-components in political economy.  
Since politics is the fulcrum upon which the economy revolves, stakeholders ought to monitor politically-motivated 
alteration of economic data and its antecedent risks so as to determine the impact on the welfare of citizens. 
Considering the linkage between elections and the economic wellbeing of domestic firms, governance culture and 
trade, it is argued that the potential for political conflict during electoral window has significant negative effects on 
cross-border trading. The unabated civil crises in some countries like Central African Republic, Democratic Republic 
of Congo, Egypt, Somalia, Syria, Pakistan, Israel-Palestine conflicts are credible reference points, even where these 
did not arise from electoral windows. This hinders business transactions including financial assets and sovereign 
bonds. When foreign portfolio investments are distorted, the spill over effect on the national economic parameters 
are enormous. This can result in reduced gross domestic product and high capital flights powered by divestments of 
foreign portfolios (Blomberg and Hess, 2003, Acemoglu and Yared, 2010).  
Partisanship and governance style affect stock market movement. Hence it is a veritable predicting economic tool for 
GDP growth, trade balances, and inflation as well as unemployment rates. The reverse market-to-political policies 
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influence through lobbyism, campaign contributions to particular party candidates justify these circular relationships 
to firm-specific stock price effects (Knight, 2007; Siokis and Kapopoulos, 2007; Mattozzi, 2008; Brunner, 2009; 
Wong and McAleer, 2009; Gerber, Huber and Washington, 2009; and Furio and Pardo, 2010, 2012). Therefore, 
political outcome of an election affects corporate performance as a result of the pattern of government expenditure, 
tax policies, consumption patterns and investment. Inflation-unemployment interplay as well as other key 
macroeconomic parameters are at the mercy of the ruling party possibly due to the fusion of monetary and fiscal 
government agencies.  
Accordingly, Oehler, Walker and Wendt, (2011) observe that through sector-specific government policies, stock 
market performance may be distortorted prior to an election window. They conclude that party’s ideology has a way 
of impacting significantly on market returns. This they supported using the cumulative abnormal returns from the 
capital market. Implying therefore that presidents and their political parties’ ideology is instrumental to national 
economic health. Where economic fundamentals are at variance with realities, the traditional political economy 
models determine market operation. Empirical evidence in support of no significant impact of partisanship on 
inflation may hold in the case of national monetary policy of a single currency market like the European Union 
currency. Here the regional regulatory agency’s (European central bank) objective of sustainable price stability 
comes to the fore (He, Lin, Wu & Dufrene, (2009). This reduces the probability of volatility as winner of the election 
becomes clearer (Goodell & Bodey, 2012).  
Opportunistic opposition governments certainly choose to fortify strategies that are against inflation in other to win 
voters sympathy in the course of election years. At the same time incumbents which implemented contrary policy of 
reducing inflation might employ monetary expansion towards the end of their electoral mandate. This is done so as to 
win elections in a period of aggregate economic growth. The more competitive elections are, the higher the tendency 
to create political business cycle where opportunistic strategy to stimulate economic expansion by sustaining 
avoidable cost for social welfare are implemented (Krause, 2005).  
Arguably, politics and economics appear to be two dependent fields of human endeavour that cannot be separated 
within the confine of political business cycles. Political business cycles represent unending cycles in macroeconomic 
variables with its origin from electoral activities. The trade-off between inflation and unemployment is assumed to 
thrive on myopic and retrospective views of voters, hence, opportunistic political business cycle model envisages 
governments’ willingness to shoot up employment figures just before elections through various operational policies 
(Garcia-Sanchez, Mordan and Cuadrado-Ballesteros, 2014; Vasquez-Ruiz, Rivas and Daz, 2014). This enables them 
to accept higher than optimal inflation rate. Opportunistic behaviour takes effect in pre-election years, while the 
partisan behaviour is manifests between different parties’ tenure in office (Klomp and de Haan, 2013; Foremny and 
Riedel, 2014; Shelton, 2014). Therefore, there exist a timing difference in the political business cycle theory.  
According to Karakas (2014), political business cycles manifest in all countries regardless of stages of development, 
governance structures and robust institutional framework. Political manipulation using electoral outcomes confirms 
the invisible determinant of macroeconomic variables (real per capita GNP, inflation, taxes and unemployment). This 
is through the exploitation of voters irrationality evidenced by short memories. This manipulation of policy tools by 
incumbent politicians through the stimulation of the economy prior to election to enhance re-election chances could be 
expansionary or contractionary policies. This they do in connivance with various government institutional agencies. 
Interestingly, such deliberate manipulation might result in unpleasant consequences on the long-run, such as 
hyperinflation, growth without corresponding development, low rate of savings, unfavourable trade balance among 
others. Reversal of actions such as raising taxes, interest rate, getting to its ceiling without recourse to economic 
fundamental and market forces as well as heightened austerity measures present a big challenge to voters.  
Rakic, Stanojevic and Rađenovic, (2015) submits that inflation and unemployment in the pre-election window is 
determined by political interests with the ultimate reversal in post-election period to its level before the electoral events. 
For example, people engaged in illegal activities such as prostitution, drug-dealing, banned gambling, smuggling 
among others may be classified as employed during elction window only to be classified as unemployed after election. 
We argue that state rules to stem the above vices are ignored before elections so as to give the nation a high aggregate 
employment status. But these are not tolerated as soon as elections are over. Politicians demand for re-election without 
considering the national economic stability and social security of citizens lends credence to their use of expansionary 
monetary policy before the elections so as to reduce unemployment (Akhmedov & Zhuravskaya, 2004; Drazen & 
Elsava, 2005; Veiga & Veiga, 2007; Findley, 2015). This expansionary monetary policy brings to the fore the 
relatedness of political business cycles and political budget cycles. This suggests that period of low unemployment 
with low inflation rate increase the probability of re-election and reverses shortly as inflation adjusts.  
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Drazen (2000) opines that to cushion the inflation-unemployment puzzle (trade-off between the inflation rate and 
unemployment), Central banks should accommodate this political strategy from governments to avert sharp rise in 
interest rates at the times of re-election. The absence of a long-run trade-off with reference to inflation and 
unemployment thus tends to push the unemployment rate below some tolerable extent with accelerated inflation. We 
are of the opinion that the absence of long-run neutrality of inflation and growth in money supply is an axiom with 
wider acceptance if general equilibrium in the economic systems is to be attained.  
Therefore, unemployment, inflation, money supply, capital market, real interest rates and other macroeconomic 
indices have effect on nation’s social and economic welfare. The influence of expansionary monetary policy on 
interest rates depicts an inverse relationship. This agrees with the postulations that monetary regulation is dependent 
on political manipulations (Leertouwer & Maier, 2001&2002). Haynes and Stone (1989) find a four-year cycle on 
GNP, unemployment, GDP and inflation, overlapping with election time. Based on the foregoing there is therefore 
the need to examine the deliberate reinvention of the wheel, for macroeconomic indices such as interest rate, 
inflation, exchange rate, index of industrial output, stock prices among others by the different political party ideology, 
which is the aim of this study. 
2. Review of Related Literature 
The reaction of inflation and output gap driven by increased unemployment at any period has a multiplying negative 
effect on the general economy. The pre-election period political objectives of incumbent parties ought to unite with 
opposition parties. Increase in public sector investments, expenditure on employees’ compensation, subsidies, 
unemployment benefit and social welfare prior to election window suggest a bubble. The imminent reversal 
afterwards shows that the players are not interested in the citizens’ wellness rather their inordinate ambition (Eboigbe, 
2016).  
Government deliberate increase in tax revenues before and after elections to fund increased expenditures and 
manipulated fiscal policies culminates in income redistributive manoeuvring. This is done through making limited 
businesses and individual to go through recession. This recession immediately translates into the national health 
evidenced in GDP and other indicators after the events (Kachelein, Imami & Lami, 2008). Wolfers and Zitzewitz 
(2004), find that increase in unemployment rate translates to reduction of votes received by the incumbent party in an 
election. Rakic, Stanojevic and Radjenovic, (2015) confirms the existence of inflation and unemployment in a pre 
and post-election period resulting from deliberate adjustment due to political interests with the likelihood of reversal 
to their original level. Tutar and Tansel (2000), Kuzu (2001), Asutay (2004) study reveals budget deficits 
relationship with electoral cycles in Turkey. This manifested when the monthly and quarterly data were used but but 
vanishes when annualized data were used indicating that elections is of no relevance on annual data. 
Capital markets activities as well as general economic development thrives on volume (breadth and depth), 
confidence and liquidity fuelled by increased cash flows. Liquidity problems in the financial markets accompanied 
by low productivity tends to reinforce credit constraint shock, with an associated effect of recession which is highly 
detrimental to the economic health. Inflation-targeting central banks seems to put more emphasis on employment and 
wage changes so as to prevent surge in wage inflation to forestall general price inflation. The differences in 
economic conditions of members of various regional political and economic groupings manifests in various 
country’s business cycle dynamics and reactions to monetary policy framework on the basis of national 
macroeconomic data (Overman & Puga 2002; Wall & Zoega, 2002; Fang & Silos, 2012). Unemployment is a cost to 
the workers, employer and the nation. As workers’ purchasing power diminishes, employers’ experiences low 
productivity with lower market share and reduced turnover while the national economic performance will experience 
lower GDP. Rise and fall in capital market indices are also not excluded (Eboigbe, 2016).  
This politically motivated manipulation of economic data leads temporarirly to biased redistribution of wealth. At 
other times it may be on form of interference with market forces which in turn hampers competition culminating in 
price manipulation. Andrikopoulos, Ioannis and Prodromidis, (2004), Sieg and Batool (2012) confirm that 
unemployment tends to be lower in pre-election periods and surges immediately after elections conceivably due to 
politically inspired employment patterns. They argue further that inflation drop in pre-election may also not be 
unconnected with pre-electoral price regulatory mechanism and increment in public borrowings for deficit budget. 
Based on the forgoing arguments and evidences, we hypothesized therefore that: 
The ideology of Political party in power has significant directional relationship with macroeconomic variables 
within the electoral cycles of countries. 
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3. Methodology, Econometric Fundamentals and Model Specification 
A multiple regression model which incorporates dummy variables to capture the different parties in power is used to 
address the relationship between partisanship/governance style and market returns, which is one of the objectives of 
this study. Following the pioneering work of Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) and the traditional event study 
models, the following model is specified: 
rt+1 = α1lwt + α2rwt + γrt + ut+1                                              (1) 
Where rt+1 is stock returns; lw is the dummy that takes 1 when a leftist-oriented political party is in power, and  
otherwise; rw is the dummy variable that takes the value of 1 when a rightist-oriented party is in power and 
otherwise. When equation (1) is lagged one period with respect to returns r, it becomes: 
rt = α1lwt + α2rwt + γrt-1 + ut                                                       (2)  
In order to avoid omitted variable difficulties in the model, an index of world stock prices is built into the model to 
become:  
rt = α1lwt + α2rwt + δWIt + γrt-1 + ut+1                                           (3) 
Where WI is the index of world stock market wherein we considered MSCI data for the samples of essence due to its 
universal credibility for its independent of national agencies. 
From the model, the signs of α1 or α2 reflect the effect of the party orientation on stock market. A positive coefficient 
for any of the party dummy implies that the party pursues a pro-output expansion and employment growth policy 
which will lead to boom and increase in the stock market returns. While a negative coefficient implies that the 
particular political party pursues a policy that strangulates output growth (perhaps by fighting inflation) which leads 
to a drop in stock market performance and returns.  
The panel data estimation technique was adopted since economic variables from different economic blocks are used 
in the estimation (see Woodridge, 2001), wherein the longitudinal research design is deemed imperative. Using the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and the dynamic system GMM (generalized method of moment) estimation 
techniques, the problem of heterogeneity and simultaneity that may exist between policy instrument and output gap 
or inflation over time is addressed. The data stream for this study were sourced from various international regulatory 
and rating agencies such as Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) which was designed to measure equity 
market performance, the World Bank and the Trading Economics.  
The selected countries of interest here are independent democratic countries of the global community. Where the 
sampled size includes the United Kingdom, United States of America, Japan, China, Hong Kong as well as Egypt. 
Also on the list are Republic of South Africa, Brazil, Nigeria, France and Germany. This is with a view to revealing 
globally the effect of political events on capital market and national economic indices. A critical look at the list 
reveals that the countries have stable democratic culture as well as leaders in their respective economic and 
sub-regional groupings. The sampled countries are also in the first forty largest economy hence findings therefrom 
can substantiate globally acceptable economic and investment decision theories. Data used covered the period 
2000-2015 for the various election dated.  
The following are the various countries politically-related events dates for the countries as indicated with the 
political parties in brackets. Republic of South Africa -14th April 2004 (ANC), 22nd April 2009 (ANC) and 07th May 
2014 (ANC). Nigeria: 19th April 2003 (PDP), 21st April 2007 (PDP), 16th April 2011 (PDP) and 28th march 2015 
(APC). Egypt: 25th May 2005 (Political Referendum), 26th march 2007 (Political Referendum), 19th march 
2011(Political Referendum), 24th May 2012 (Election/Freedom Justice Party), 03rd July 2013 (Coup) and 28th May 
2014 (Independent). United Kingdom: 07th May 2000 (LP), 05th May 2005 (LP), 06th May 2010 (CP/LP) and 07th 
May 2015 (CP). United State of America: 07th November 2000 (Republican), 02nd November 2004 (Republican), 
04th November 2008 (Democrat) and 06th November 2012(Democrat). China: 20th march 2004 (DP), 22nd march 2008 
(CNP), 14th march 2012 (CNP) and 16th march 2016 (DP). Japan: 11th September 2005(LDP), 30th August 2009(LDP), 
16th December 2012(LDP) and 14th December 2014(LDP). Brazil: 06th October 2002(PDT), 01st October 2005 (PDT), 
3rd &31st October 2010(PDT) and 05th October 2014(PDT). Hong Kong: 28th February 2002(Non-partisanship), 16th 
June 2005(Non-partisanship), 25th march 2007(Non-partisanship) and 25th march 2012(Non-partisanship). Germany: 
22nd September 2002(SDP), 18th September 2005(CDU), 27th September 2009(CDU) and 22nd September 2013(CDU). 
France: 5th -6th May 2002(RR), 5th -6th May 2007(UPM) and 5th -6th May 2012(SP). 
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4. Result Presentation and Discussion of Findings 
Here we report the descriptive and empirical analysis of the macroeconomic variables used in the study and their 
respective reactions to different political orientations within different time. 
 
Table 1a. Descriptive statistics of macroeconomic data 
 3 months before 12 months before  3 months after 12 months after 
Country Mean Std Mean Std  Mean Std Mean Std 
For interest rate 
UK 1.61 1.85 1.78 1.88  1.92 2.13 1.87 1.97 
US 2.92 6.28 1.53 2.86  1.24 0.79 1.40 1.24 
Brazil 12.58 3.26 14.28 4.68  13.64 4.61 12.47 4.73 
Egypt 8.90 0.74 9.07 6.34  9.08 0.76 9.02 0.60 
S. Africa 7.25 1.38 4.84 3.34  8.00 2.22 9.03 3.12 
Nigeria 9.22 3.12 10.65 4.31  9.39 2.90 9.15 2.95 
H Kong 3.94 2.65 4.28 1.20  3.58 2.47 3.45 2.47 
China 5.87 2.36 6.11 2.65  6.43 0.93 6.22 0.74 
Japan 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.41  0.02 0.05 0.05 0.11 
France 2.83 0.72 2.70 0.98  2.61 1.22 2.81 1.45 
Germany 10.58 12.56 3.17 0.91  2.00 0.00 1.65 0.58 
For output growth 
UK 0.72 2.17 -1.15 9.34  2.01 1.75 1.48 8.50 
US -0.43 4.64 1.26 9.03  -2.64 7.60 -2.26 8.61 
Brazil 2.01 6.57 5.59 8.62  1.59 4.89 1.62 2.00 
Egypt 5.71 11.79 -1.84 9.15  1.58 18.24 4.54 2.71 
S. Africa -4.03 8.55 -1.55 8.01  -5.21 9.49 2.62 1.43 
Nigeria 1.37 2.69 1.72 7.26  0.44 0.59 -0.82 1.84 
H Kong -0.80 1.36 1.86 7.27  2.50 6.92 0.62 0.51 
China 14.41 4.72 15.73 8.65  12.41 5.16 12.11 1.14 
Japan -10.22 11.34 -5.78 10.40  -6.02 7.18 3.64 0.17 
France -0.74 1.91 0.14 9.40  0.18 2.60 -1.01 0.42 
Germany -4.32 9.28 -4.39 9.43  -0.57 6.15 4.18 0.39 
For inflation 
UK 1.72 1.49 1.60 0.90  1.94 1.47 2.02 1.52 
US 3.14 1.29 3.07 1.17  1.98 1.97 1.53 1.96 
Brazil 5.80 0.93 5.91 1.30  5.96 0.71 6.52 5.36 
Egypt 9.66 3.08 8.84 1.99  8.27 3.43 8.46 7.25 
S. Africa 4.92 3.55 6.39 3.35  5.39 2.43 3.37 3.82 
Nigeria 8.93 2.51 9.46 3.05  7.93 3.29 8.77 4.93 
H Kong 2.63 2.26 2.68 2.28  2.59 1.49 2.51 1.37 
China 4.73 2.21 4.16 2.28  4.50 2.96 3.33 3.04 
Japan -0.91 0.88 -0.17 1.13  -0.12 1.01 0.14 0.47 
France 1.81 0.50 1.88 0.49  1.75 0.14 1.99 1.12 
Germany 1.46 0.12 1.35 0.51  1.72 0.30 1.51 1.04 
Source: Authors’ computation 2017 
 
From Table 1b below, we try to juxtapose the windows by each other in the pre-and post-electoral event. The speed 
of reversals represented (by % changes) shows that there is a reversal after the elections. This perhaps are the effort 
of regulatory agency of government to undo the pre-election effect.  
  
http://ijfr.sciedupress.com International Journal of Financial Research Vol. 9, No. 1; 2018 
Published by Sciedu Press                        231                          ISSN 1923-4023  E-ISSN 1923-4031 
Table 1b. Descriptive statistics of macroeconomic variables and % changes  
 
3-BEF 3-AFT  12-BEF 12-AFT 
 Country Mean Mean % CHG  Mean Mean %CHG 
 For interest rate     
UK 1.61 1.92 19  1.78 1.87 5 
USA 2.92 1.24 -58  1.53 1.4 -8.5 
Brazil 12.58 13.64 8.4  14.28 12.47 -12.7 
Egypt 8.9 9.09 2.1  9.07 9.02 -5.5 
S. Africa 7.25 8 10  4.84 9.03 86.6 
Nigeria 9.22 9.39 1.8  10.65 9.15 -14 
H Kong 3.94 3.58 -9  4.28 3.45 -19 
China 5.87 6.43 9.5  6.11 6.22 1.8 
Japan 0.03 0.02 -33  0.04 0.05 25 
France 2.83 2.61 -7.8  2.7 2.81 4 
Germany 10.58 2 -81  3.17 1.65 50 
 For output growth For output growth 
UK 0.72 2.01 179  -1.15 1.48 29 
USA -0.43 -2.64 -514  1.26 -2.26 -79 
Brazil 2.01 1.59 -21  5.59 1.62 -71 
Egypt 5.71 1.58 -72  -1.84 4.54 147 
S. Africa -4.03 -5.21 -29  -1.55 2.62 69 
Nigeria 1.37 0.44 -69  1.72 -0.82 -52 
H Kong -0.8 2.5 213  1.86 0.62 -67 
China 14.41 12.41 -16  15.73 12.11 -23 
Japan -10.22 -6.02 41  -5.78 3.64 37 
France -0.74 0.18 76  0.14 -1.01 -621 
Germany -4.32 -0.57 86  -4.39 4.18 4.8 
 For inflation For inflation 
UK 1.72 1.94 13 
 1.6 2.02 26 
USA 3.14 1.98 -37  3.07 1.53 -50 
Brazil 5.8 5.96 2.8  5.91 6.52 10 
Egypt 9.66 8.27 -14.4  8.84 8.46 -4.3 
S. Africa 4.92 5.39 9.6  6.39 3.37 -47 
Nigeria 8.93 7.93 -11  9.46 8.77 -7.3 
H Kong 2.63 2.59 -1.5  2.68 2.51 -6.3 
China 4.73 4.5 -4.9  4.16 3.33 -20 
Japan -0.91 -0.12 87  -0.17 0.14 17.6 
France 1.81 1.75 -3.3  1.88 1.99 5.9 
Germany 1.46 1.72 18  1.35 1.51 11.9 
Source: Authors’ computation 2017 
  
http://ijfr.sciedupress.com International Journal of Financial Research Vol. 9, No. 1; 2018 
Published by Sciedu Press                        232                          ISSN 1923-4023  E-ISSN 1923-4031 
Table 1c below shows the effect of the events in one year pre-and post-election development in the various 
macroeconomic determinants. From the table, there is a trend with some showing U-shaped and others Bell-shaped. 
Here, nations with weak institutions and those with relatively strong institutions can be deduced.  
 
Table 1c. Descriptive statistics of macroeconomic variables and % changes 
 
12-BEF 3-BEF 
 
3-AFT 12-AFT 
 Country Mean Mean % CHG Mean MEAN %CHG 
For interest rate     
UK 1.78 1.61 -9.55056 1.92 1.87 -2.6738 
USA 1.53 2.92 90.84967 1.24 1.4 11.4286 
Brazil 14.28 12.58 -11.9048 13.64 12.47 -9.3825 
Egypt 9.07 8.9 -1.87431 9.08 9.02 -0.66519 
S. Africa 4.84 7.25 49.79339 8 9.03 11.4064 
Nigeria 10.65 9.22 -13.4272 9.39 9.15 -2.62295 
H Kong 4.28 3.94 -7.94393 3.58 3.45 -3.7681 
China 6.11 5.87 -3.92799 6.43 6.22 -3.3762 
Japan 0.04 0.03 -25 0.02 0.05 60 
France 2.7 2.83 4.814815 2.61 2.81 7.117 
Germany 3.17 10.58 233.7539 2 1.65 -21.212 
For output growth For output growth 
UK -1.15 0.72 162.609 2.01 1.48 -35.8108 
USA 1.26 -0.43 -134.127 -2.64 -2.26 16.814 
Brazil 5.59 2.01 -64.0429 1.59 1.62 1.85185 
Egypt -1.84 5.71 410.326 1.58 4.54 65.1982 
S. Africa -1.55 -4.03 -160 -5.21 2.62 298.855 
Nigeria 1.72 1.37 -20.3488 0.44 -0.82 -153.659 
H Kong 1.86 -0.8 -143.011 2.5 0.62 -303.226 
China 15.73 14.41 -8.39161 12.41 12.11 -2.47729 
Japan -5.78 -10.22 76.81661 -6.02 3.64 265.385 
France 0.14 -0.74 -628.571 0.18 -1.01 -117.822 
Germany -4.39 -4.32 1.59453 -0.57 4.18 113.636 
For inflation For inflation 
UK 1.6 1.72 7.5 1.94 2.02 -3.9604 
USA 3.07 3.14 2.28013 1.98 1.53 -29.4118 
Brazil 5.91 5.8 -1.86125 5.96 6.52 8.58896 
Egypt 8.84 9.66 9.276018 8.27 8.46 2.24586 
S. Africa 6.39 4.92 -23.0047 5.39 3.37 -59.9407 
Nigeria 9.46 8.93 -5.60254 7.93 8.77 9.57811 
H Kong 2.68 2.63 -1.86567 2.59 2.51 -3.18725 
China 4.16 4.73 13.70192 4.5 3.33 -35.135 
Japan -0.17 -0.91 435.2941 -0.12 0.14 185.714 
France 1.88 1.81 -3.7234 1.75 1.99 12.0603 
Germany 1.35 1.46 8.148148 1.72 1.51 -13.9073 
Source: Authors’ computation 2017  
 
From these analyses above, countries with higher output levels for the 3 months before and less after elections 
indicates that effort may have been put in place to ensure such improved output performance in order to enhance the 
http://ijfr.sciedupress.com International Journal of Financial Research Vol. 9, No. 1; 2018 
Published by Sciedu Press                        233                          ISSN 1923-4023  E-ISSN 1923-4031 
position of the incumbent before electorates. For 12 months after elections, average output growth did not follow a 
reasonable pattern for the countries. Just like the interest rate case, some countries had higher growth rates 3 months 
before elections and others had lower growth rates. Comparing the growth rates for within the periods, it can be seen 
that the average growth rates of output was fairly low in the 3 months before elections period, compared with 12 
months period for most of the countries. In the same vein, the growth rates were lower in the 3 months just after 
elections compared with 12 months after the elections. Apparently, output growth generally tends to fall during the 
period just before and just after elections in the sampled countries. This is perhaps connected with high costs of 
reversal resulting in pre-election deterioration in aggregate economic activity theory called reverse electoral business 
cycle. This is motivated by investment delay determined by size of policy differences between the contending 
political parties. 
In terms of the opportunistic political cycle theory, this arrangement implies that the inflation rate was left 
unattended to by the monetary policy authorities during the period just before the elections in order to focus on 
improving the output levels. Stimulating output through lower interest rates could have had the side-effects of 
increasing the inflation rates. But the Central Banks are not interested in rising prices at the stage of the 
electioneering period as long as output growth is improving (see Hayo & Hefeker, 2008; Masciandaro & Tabellini, 
1991).  
Below is the tabular performances of the variables for the selected country to the electoral windows. Tables 1a and 
1b above were replicated in Table 1d below for clarity. 
 
Table 1d. Macroeconomic variables of countries reaction to electoral window 
INFLATION RATE HIGH LOW 
3-months pre USA, Egypt, China, Nigeria, 
Hong Kong, France 
UK, Brazil, South Africa, Japan, 
Germany 
3-months post UK, Brazil, Japan, South Africa, 
Germany 
USA, Egypt, China, Nigeria, 
Hong Kong, France 
12-months pre USA, Egypt, South Africa, 
Nigeria, Hong Kong, China 
UK, Brazil, China, Japan, 
France, Germany 
12-months post UK, Brazil, Japan, France, 
Germany 
USA, Egypt, South Africa, 
Nigeria, Hong Kong, China 
INTEREST RATE HIGH LOW 
3-months pre USA, Hong Kong, Japan, 
France, Germany 
UK, Brazil, China, Egypt, South 
Africa, Nigeria 
3-months post UK, Brazil, China, Egypt, South 
Africa, Nigeria  
USA, Hong Kong, Japan, 
France, Germany  
12-months pre USA, Brazil, Nigeria, Hong 
Kong, Germany, Egypt 
UK, South Africa, China, Japan, 
France 
12-months post UK, South Africa, China, Japan, 
France 
USA, Brazil, Nigeria, Hong 
Kong, Germany, Egypt 
OUTPUT GAP HIGH LOW 
3-months pre USA, South Africa, Egypt, 
Nigeria, China, Germany 
UK, Japan, France, Hong Kong, 
Brazil 
3-months post UK, Hong Kong, Japan, France, 
Germany 
USA, South Africa, Brazil, 
Egypt, Nigeria, China 
12-months pre USA, Brazil, Nigeria, Hong 
Kong, China, France 
UK, South Africa, Egypt, Japan, 
Germany 
12-months post UK, South Africa, Egypt, Japan, 
Germany 
USA, Brazil, Nigeria, Hong 
Kong, China, France 
Source: Authors’ computation 2017 
 
Below are charts for the various windows for the selected countries which further reveal the relationship of election 
on the key macroeconomic variables within the time frame.  
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Figure 1a. Interest rate for 12-months before, 3-months before, 3-months after and 12-months after  
Source: Authors’ computation 2017 
 
 
Figure 1b. Output growth for 12-months before, 3-months before, 3-months after and 12-months after 
Source: Authors’ computation 2017 
 
 
Figure 1c. Inflation rate for 12-months before, 3-months before, 3-months after and 12-months after 
Source: Authors’ computation 2017  
 
From charts 1a-1c, the directional movement in various indices for measuring the health of national economies is 
significant. To us, the comovement is in consonance with the two-opposing philosophy of the electorates and the 
elected officeholders. The voters’ goals are determined by the current development of the economic parameters, 
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geared towards their latest experience of the maniupulated macroeconomic data from government. The goal of 
political party in power stems from its perception and belief in voters decaying and short memory (Nordhaus, 1975 
& 1989) 
5. Style of Governance, Partisanship and Market Returns 
The working hypotheses of this study also investigated the effects of partisanship on the stock market position and 
returns. The results in Table 2 below with high R2 values show that the estimations captured the relationships quite 
well. The estimations were performed only for the countries where the required information is available. In the 
results, the coefficients of the party orientation were negative for the US, China, France and Germany, but it was 
positive (indicative of party effect) for Nigeria and Egypt. This indicates that election expectations in the market are 
more positive in African countries than in the more advanced markets (less in US and China and negligible in France 
and Germany). 
 
Table 2. Parties and stock returns 
Variable 
US Egypt Nigeria China France Germany 
Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T Coef. T 
LW -0.07* 
-2.25 
 
(0.03) 
0.88* 
2.32 
(0.00) 
3.85* 
2.87 
(0.00) 
-0.08 
-0.33 
(0.74) 
-0.98* 
-2.04 
(0.04) 
-2.25** 
-4.41 
(0.00) 
RW -0.07** 
-3.21 
(0.00) 
0.89* 
2.44 
(0.02) 
4.29** 
3.38 
(0.00) 
-0.07 
-0.28 
(0.78) 
-0.99* 
-2.07 
(0.04) 
-2.25** 
-4.36 
(0.00) 
WI 1.01** 
39.4 
(0.00) 
-0.05 
-0.97 
(0.33) 
-0.27 
1.50 
(0.14) 
0.04 
1.16 
(0.25) 
1.20** 
21.6 
(0.00) 
1.35** 
23.2 
(0.00) 
LSP(-1) 0.00 
0.46 
(0.64) 
0.92** 
43.1 
(0.00) 
0.96** 
33.8 
(0.00) 
0.94** 
33.6 
(0.00) 
-0.06 
-1.49 
(0.14) 
-0.02 
-0.52 
(0.61) 
R-sq. 0.99 
 
0.94 
 
0.92 
 
0.95 
 
0.98 
 
0.98 
 
P-values are in parenthesis  
Source: Authors’ computations 2017 
 
The specific focus of the analysis is on the signs of the coefficients for the party orientations (either incumbent or 
opposition). A partisanship effect is recognized if the coefficients for the variables are different either in signs, size 
or significance. From the results in the above table, the coefficients of the partisanship effects have the same signs 
for each of the countries and significant except for Nigeria and Egypt. Also, the coefficients are similar in terms of 
size. Hence, the results show that the party orientation does have significant impact on stock market returns for the 
selected countries except for Nigeria and Egypt.  
6. Conclusion, Policy Implication and Recommendations 
In the light of the results from the analysis above, the study therefore provides conclusive evidnce of the existence of 
a significant relationship between national economic performance data and electoral cycles in countries of the world 
irrespective of their developmental stages and institutional setting. There is also evidence that since Central Banks 
are not interested in rising prices during electioneering period, given improvments in outputs, electorates fall into the 
trap set by political actors (Hayo and Hefeker, 2008; Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991). This comovement appears to 
support the two opposing philosophies of the electorates and the elected officeholders. The voters’ goals of assessing 
performances by current development in the economic parameters arising from what they have received lately from 
government agencies as well as incumbent governments’ goalsin manipulation originating from their perception and 
belief in voters decaying and forgetful memory. 
On the other hand, the study also shows that monetary authorities tend to integrate incumbent government objectives 
and vision to winning elections into their regulatory policies. This they do by guaranteeing favourable 
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macroeconomic indicators for the period before the elections. More importantly, the result of the analysis shows that 
political activities’ effects on output and inflation tend to vary within a dynamic structure. This implies that policy 
aimed at influencing these factors should be tailored along short term and long term effective policy making for the 
ever- changing dynamics of modern financial system.  
As a policy recommendation, there is need to take cognizance of the lag effect in the design of financial and 
monetary policies in order to ensure that their targets are effectively monitored. In particular, monetary policies need 
to be forward looking in their approach to address real sector development in the countries examined. This may 
explain why some investment rules and regulations may not be sufficient for modern day competitive global business. 
Therefore, we call for a better integration between financial and economic data into the political framework to ensure 
genuine devlopment. We recommend the automation of capital market activities aimed at bridging information 
asymmetry among market participants as well as institutional strengthening of all government agencies in charge of 
macro-economic data and capital markets to avoid easy manipulation of one by another. 
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